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Abstract
Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been 
studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice 
environments, especially where there are many alternatives. This article fills this gap in the literature. I 
show how Fine and Gray’s Competing Risks Event History Analysis can be used to tease apart the causes 
of policy convergence. I apply the method to an examination of the reasons why, from the mid-1990s to 
2007, many countries created independent deposit insurers. I find an interaction between international 
recommendations and regional peers’ choices, particularly in the European Union. However, convergence 
appears to slow under the particular conditions of a banking crisis, regardless of how well independence 
is promoted. Possibly due to electoral incentives, democracies seem to have been more likely to create 
independent insurers. Ultimately, I demonstrate how competing risks analysis can help enable future research 
on policy choices, complementing methods previously applied in political economy.
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Why do policies often converge across countries at the same time? Do the circumstances of indi-
vidual countries just happen to incline policymakers to make the same choices or are countries 
influenced by common external experiences, such as trade relations, international organization 
recommendations, and so on? These questions have been addressed before on a range of policies, 
such as those pertaining to pensions (Brooks, 2005), stock exchanges (Weber et al., 2009), trade 
agreements (Elkins et al., 2006), and regulatory independence (Gilardi, 2005). All of these studies 
looked at ‘either/or’ choices made in isolation. But how can we determine the reasons for policy 
convergence when (1) there are multiple alternatives and (2) choices on different, but necessarily 
related issues are made simultaneously? The case of de jure deposit insurance (DI) governance 
illustrates the difficulty of understanding policy convergence.
Decision-makers creating DI schemes have many choices (see Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). 
One important choice is who will officially govern the programme. There are at least three types of 
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bodies to choose from. The insurer can be run directly through the ministry of finance (MoF), the 
central bank,1 or be delegated to a specialized independent agency.
Considering that there are multiple de jure governance options to choose from, how can we 
determine why countries nonetheless converged on independent governance from the mid-1990s? 
This is an especially thorny issue since governance choices were almost always part of decisions 
to create new DI. Such problems have not been addressed empirically in the political economy 
literature though they plague any attempt to examine the causes of new policy and institutional 
variation. In this article, I aim to push the methodological boundaries of policy-convergence 
research by examining DI governance choices.
The current boundaries are defined by the diffusion literature’s event history analysis (EHA) 
‘toolkit’ (see Brooks, 2005; Elkins et al., 2006; Gilardi, 2005; Lee and Strang, 2006; Shipan and 
Volden, 2008; Strang and Tuma, 1993; Weber et al., 2009). The toolkit is focused on single transi-
tions: why a choice is made or not. Though successfully applied to many policy areas, it is inade-
quate when examining decisions that involve more than one mutually exclusive alternative, for 
example when DI governance choices are attached to decisions to create new insurers. Given the 
toolkit’s limitations, how can we identify the reasons for choosing specific governance styles from 
those influencing decisions to create deposit insurance?2
Some initial work has tried to tackle situations with multiple choices made in isolation (see 
Brooks, 2007; Jones and Branton, 2005). In this article, I expand the toolkit by showing how the 
Fine and Gray Competing Risks Event History Analysis (FG-CREHA) can be used to examine 
complex choice environments (see Fine and Gray, 1999). It is already widely used in epidemiology 
(see Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011; Pintilie, 2007) and is easy to implement.3
Section 1 discusses convergence from the mid-1990s on independent DI in a dataset of 174 
countries and territories from the 1930s to 2007. Section 2 lays out competing hypotheses for why 
countries adopted certain governance types for new insurers. The first subsection is domestically 
focused and assumes policymakers had full information about optimal governance types. The sec-
ond subsection assumes that decision-makers relied on information provided by international 
actors in the form of ‘best practice’ recommendations. Section 3 demonstrates that the FG-CREHA 
is preferable for examining these hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the results. It finds evidence that 
an interaction between international recommendations and regional peers’ choices influenced 
countries to create independent insurers, particularly in the European Union (EU). Convergence 
appears to slow during banking crises, regardless of how well independence is promoted. Due to 
electoral incentives, democracies seem to have been more likely to create independent insurers. 
Ultimately, I demonstrate how the FG-CREHA can advance research on policy choices, comple-
menting methods previously applied in political economy.
1. Potential policy diffusion
For much of the 20th century explicit DI was adopted intermittently. The adoption rate, however, 
increased from the 1980s. Later de jure independent DI, separate from general DI, became the 
dominant international governance trend. This finding motivates my approach by indicating that 
diffusion may have played a significant role in causing individual countries to choose the same 
structures around the same time (see Simmons and Elkins, 2004).
The USA began one of the first explicit DI programmes in the early 1930s. The system was 
independent. From the 1930s to the present, though banks failed, no insured deposits were lost and 
there has never been a repeat of the bank runs seen in the 1930s (Grossman, 1992: 802). Despite 
this success, by 1980 only 17 countries had deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). There 
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was considerable variety in governance. Two systems were operationally independent (those of the 
USA and Norway). Some countries, such as Lebanon and the Netherlands, created central-bank-
controlled DI. The Dominican Republic and France created MoF-controlled DI in the early 1980s. 
Before the mid-1990s each governance style’s prevalence remained proportionally constant. 
However, from the mid-1990s the proportion of countries with independent DI began to increase 
substantially, while the other types’ prevalence remained constant (see Figure 1).4
It is important at this point to make a note about the data. Between 1980 and the 2007/08 finan-
cial crisis, once a country established an insurer it tended not to alter its governance.5 Insurers 
changed governance only five times (about 6 percent of transitions). For this reason, I confine my 
theoretical discussion and empirical investigation to governance choices for jurisdictions’ first 
explicit DI to achieve empirically meaningful results.
2. Policy diffusion or not
This section presents possible explanations for this phenomenon, including non-diffusion domestic 
economic-political causes, as well as international diffusion theories.
2.1. Domestic causes
The first two theories focus on domestic causes of governance choices. They implicitly assume that 
any multi-country trends are coincidental.
2.1.1. Moral hazard and democracy. Independence may help DI systems maintain banking-system 
stability while avoiding high public resolution costs that may result from guaranteeing deposits. 
Democratic policymakers may be more likely to delegate deposit insurance, because they have 
incentives to prevent crises and keep costs low.
Figure 1. Prevalence of Explicit Deposit Insurance Governance in 174 Countries (1970–2007).
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A proximate cause of banking crises is what Friedman and Schwartz (1963) called the ‘conta-
gion of fear’. Individual bank failures prompt other banks’ depositors to withdraw their money. 
They fear that these other banks will also collapse soon. Deposit insurance can prevent such bank 
runs by separating the probability of deposit loss from bank solvency. Depositors do not need to 
run to their bank if they think it might fail, because their money is safe regardless. However, this 
separation creates moral hazard (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Grossman, 1992). Depositors no 
longer have an incentive to make decisions based on banks’ safety. Banks therefore increase risky 
lending. Stability is undermined.
There are many ways to tailor a DI programme to minimize moral hazard while also gain-
ing the benefits of deposit insurance, including closely regulating lending (see Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Grossman, 1992). Governance may play an important role in 
ensuring the effectiveness of these measures by changing how susceptible the insurer is to 
bank pressure.
Banks have an interest in loosely regulated DI. This allows them to capture risk premiums with-
out worrying about losing deposits needed to make risky loans. They also have an interest in 
deposit insurance being directly linked to the public budget (for example, MoF control) rather than 
to a fund they contribute to. If a bank fails, the public pays, and not the banks. Conversely, moral 
hazard can be decreased if guarantee payouts are linked directly to banks and are separated from 
the public budget. For deposit insurance to work in the public good (preventing bank runs and 
moral hazard), it must be able to maintain credible limits on risky lending despite private bank 
pressure to do otherwise.
A long political-economy tradition argues that delegated institutions are better able to make 
credible commitments (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Thatcher, 2002). A number of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) pieces argue that deposit insurance should be independent of politicians and 
banks to avoid conflicts of interest (Garcia, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000). Political actors with ties to 
the industry could be influenced through cronyism (see Rosas, 2006; Satyanath, 2006) to loosen 
measures that decrease moral hazard. Independent agencies may be less vulnerable to such 
pressure.6
Democratic accountability may incentivize policymakers to minimize public costs and there-
fore incline them to delegate deposit insurance. Politicians receive rents from holding office. 
Receiving rents from banks in exchange for loose DI hurts diffuse taxpayers, as crises become 
more frequent. Keefer (2007) argues that if it is hard to remove office-holders, then incumbents 
will focus on extracting rents. Incumbents do not have to worry about being removed from office 
and losing their rents. Conversely, if it is easy for the public to remove incumbents from office, 
incumbents will avoid rent maximization. It would cause them to lose their positions. These incum-
bents will be more likely to pursue policies that minimize public costs.
It may be unreasonable to assume that the electorate has a preference for one type of DI govern-
ance over another. However, it is reasonable to assume that the electorate and especially taxpayers 
have preferences for preventing, containing, and resolving crises at minimum public cost (Enoch 
et al., 2001; Keefer, 2007; Rosas, 2006, 2009). Independent DI allows incumbents to benefit both 
diffuse taxpayers who incur fewer costs from crisis responses and diffuse depositors by insuring 
them against bank failure. Elections are a hallmark of democracy that makes it easy to remove 
incumbents. This leads to the following hypothesis: democracies are more likely than autocracies 
to create independent DI.
In particular, we would expect incumbents in democracies with very competitive elections to be 
most focused on minimizing public costs. So, countries with more competitive elections are more 
likely to create independent DI.
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How can this theory explain the increase of independent DI from the mid-1990s? It could be that 
the proportion of countries with democracy simply grew following events such as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.
2.1.2. MoF credibility. There are reasons other than crony capitalism that a government may retain 
direct control of deposit insurance. Deposit guarantees are different from other economic policy 
areas where authority is often delegated, such as regulation. Insuring deposits in the uncertainty 
of banking crises involves more than demonstrating credible limits on moral hazard. In a crisis, 
payouts must be credible to prevent bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Laeven and Valen-
cia, 2008). Delegated insurers established before a banking crisis may have time to accumulate 
reassuring reserves. However, if such funds do not exist by the start of a crisis, only fiscal 
resources will be adequate. Credibly signalling the ability to use fiscal resources would likely 
require MoF control.
There are numerous examples of ministries of finance being turned to during banking crises to 
reassure depositors. During its 1997 crisis, Indonesia established a DI financed and controlled 
directly by the MoF. This preceded the establishment of an independent insurer in 2005. In 2008, 
Sweden went a step further, asserting MoF control over its previously independent DI, arguing that 
credible DI during a crisis requires direct control by fiscal actors.7 This leads to the following 
hypothesis: countries in banking crises are more likely to establish MoF-controlled DI if they have 
not already created a scheme by the start of such crises.
The problem of establishing credibility in a new DI scheme is rooted in the potential cost of 
payouts. This problem should be more acute and present even in non-crisis times in countries with 
relatively large banking sectors. Thus, we have another hypothesis: countries whose banking sec-
tors are large relative to the overall economy are more likely to choose MoF control.
These two hypotheses clearly cannot explain the independence trend, but may have mediated it.
2.2. Policy diffusion
The hypotheses so far have assumed that actors know which governance style is optimal. The fol-
lowing hypotheses assume that not all actors have information about optimal governance at all 
times. Instead, information and the incentives to incorporate it into policy are diffused through 
interactions with other countries and international actors. These processes are particularly plausi-
ble for DI governance. There are many DI choices that may affect stability and public costs. So, it 
is difficult actually to identify what role de jure governance plays in outcomes (see March and 
Simon, 1993; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). To date, only a very ambiguous empirical relationship 
has been made between DI governance and banking crises. No systematic studies have been done 
on the issue, to the author’s knowledge,8 and a summary examination of governance and banking 
crises using data from this article for 70 countries finds no correlation. Though this is not defini-
tive, it is clear that countries in the 1990s and 2000s did not have complete information about 
optimal DI governance.
Despite an absence of evidence that DI delegation prevents crises, in the mid-1990s and early 
2000s prominent international organizations began strongly to recommend independence as best 
practice. From the mid-1990s, IMF staff economists recommended that insurers be operationally 
independent from banks and political actors, and the central bank as a way of preventing deposit-
guarantee ‘pitfalls’. These included agency problems and moral hazard (Garcia, 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000).9 The recommendation was put into the World Bank and IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment 
Program when it began in 1999. These actions are correlated in time with the emergence of 
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independence as the predominant type of governance from the mid-1990s. How might they be 
causally related?
2.2.1. Regional peer diffusion. Policymakers may be influenced by their regional peers to adopt a 
given policy. This process can work through a variety of mechanisms (see Brooks, 2005: 280–1). 
One is competition (discussed below). Another is learning. Policymakers use their peers’ experi-
ences to identify optimal policies (Meseguer, 2005; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Volden et al., 
2008). Regional peers may provide useful samples of similar experiences to learn from. The most 
simplistic prediction is that countries are more likely to adopt a type of DI governance as the pro-
portion of prior adopters in their region increases.
The hypothesis is fairly neutral, as any governance type could become more likely to be adopted 
in a region when more countries adopt it. It is indistinguishable from emulation (Simmons and 
Elkins, 2004) and begs the question of why this process starts.
Perhaps an interaction between peers and best-practice recommendations could explain these 
issues. The independence recommendation may have acted as a ‘frame’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981) that focused actors’ attention. It was made by prominent actors such as IMF staff economists 
and drew on the dominant contemporary ‘independence’ paradigm (McNamara, 2002). However, 
unlike emulation, decision-makers may have been hesitant to adopt independent DI before seeing 
how well it applied to them. Regional peers that adopted the policy might have provided this infor-
mation. Policymakers may have been learning from these two pieces of information. Best-practice 
recommendations serve as informative priors, which policymakers update with the experience of 
regional peers. Over short time horizons, the fact that a growing proportion of peers are adopting a 
policy without discernible negative consequences10 may be the best new information they can get. 
As more peers adopt a policy, more actors may consider it successful. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: countries are more likely to adopt a type of DI governance as the proportion of adop-
ters in their region increases and when it is promoted as best practice.
Beyond simple geographical groups, some formal regional organizations, such as the European 
Union, may be particularly good samples to observe. In 1994, the EU created the directive on 
deposit insurance. Though the directive did not mandate a governance type, countries required to 
create deposit insurance may have sought to learn about optimal governance styles from peers with 
the same requirement. We would expect the following: from 1994 EU members and candidate 
countries were more likely to adopt independent DI.
2.2.2. Competition. In open capital markets, depositors may choose where to place their deposits 
based on the qualities of banks’ jurisdictions. Depositors may be attracted to countries with high 
guarantees. This possibly explains the existence of explicit DI and guarantee levels. How might 
competition affect governance?
Depositors may not only be influenced by guarantee levels, but also by the soundness of the 
banking system. Though guarantees are useful if a crisis occurs, depositors probably prefer to 
avoid crises. Even if their money is eventually returned, depositors incur opportunity costs from 
illiquid deposits during crises. Deposits should flow to countries with low perceived crisis proba-
bilities. Depositors may partially determine this probability by looking at countries’ public-institu-
tion quality. As discussed above, delegated DI became best practice (that is, perceived most likely 
to promote stability) from the mid-1990s. Therefore, from this point countries wishing to retain and 
gain deposits in an internationally competitive environment would adopt independent DI: coun-
tries with internationally open deposit banking sectors are more likely to adopt independent DI 
from the mid-1990s.
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Clearly, if investors had perfect information about governance-crisis relationships, the associa-
tion between competition and adoption would be constant over time. The increase in independence 
would be the result of increasing openness.
2.2.3. Crisis diffusion. Decision-makers may be especially open to recommendations when policies 
fail. If a country experiences a banking crisis, the status quo policy has demonstrably failed. There 
could be uncertainty about how to rebuild stability. Best-practice recommendations help to over-
come uncertainty by suggesting solutions. When recommendations appear to be the best alterna-
tive, actors’ preferences will converge on them, and they will be chosen more often (Blyth, 2002; 
Windmaier et al., 2007). One possible example is the rapid Latin American adoption of independ-
ent DI in the 1990s. The Inter-American Development Bank observed that countries, for example 
Argentina when suffering from the ‘Tequila Crisis’, created independent DI according to ‘interna-
tional best practice’ (IDB, 2004: 105). So: countries experiencing banking crises will be more 
likely to create independent DI after it has been promoted by prominent organizations.
2.2.4. Coercion. As mentioned earlier, the IMF promoted independent DI. Did it go beyond recom-
mending, forcing countries to create independent insurers? The IMF could have coerced policy 
choices with loan conditions (see Vreeland, 2003).
IMF advice and actions about creating deposit insurance during crises is mixed. IMF staff 
argued that ‘there is no substitute for government support in a systemic crisis’ and for countries in 
crisis ‘advice … has been not to introduce [deposit insurance] until the banking system or its major 
banks have been restructured’ (Garcia, 2000: 49). Though many documents needed to confirm IMF 
actions are not widely available,11 some do indicate that the IMF did not coerce unstable countries 
to create new independent DI. Instead, it seems to have supported or at least agreed to MoF control. 
For example, Thailand’s letter of intent for a stand-by agreement of 14 August 1997 indicates that 
a guarantee programme should be created through the MoF to restore confidence. Thailand created 
its first DI programme in 1997 with MoF control. After the crisis it was made independent.
We expect countries receiving IMF assistance will be less likely to create deposit insurance. For 
governance, we expected the following: countries signing IMF stand-by agreements are more 
likely to create new MoF deposit insurance.
3. Empirical model
To test these hypotheses, we need an empirical model that can accommodate a number of issues. 
These include (1) covariates that vary over time, (2) countries that do not adopt any form of deposit 
insurance by the end of the observation period (right censoring), and uniquely up to this point in 
the diffusion literature, (3) the likelihood of making one decision given the existence of three 
choices and their coincidence with a common choice. This section justifies the model chosen (that 
is, a Fine and Gray Competing Risks Event History Analysis) as that best able to address these 
issues. It also discusses the variables.
3.1. The EHA in policy-diffusion research
Many recent studies of policy diffusion have used the EHA to test theories of why adoption rates 
change over time (see above). In them, choices are modelled as dichotomous responses. Unit i can 
choose policy k or continue without it. The EHA is used because it directly models time by focus-
ing on the time it takes before a unit experiences an event k. This is modelled with the hazard rate 
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h(t): the instantaneous rate of an event k occurring conditional on the values of a unit i’s covari-
ates. Formally:
 h t
t T t t T t
t
i
k k i
t
|
lim Pr | ,
,X
X
( ) =
≤ ≤ + ≥( )
→∆
∆
∆
0        (1)
where Tk is the time that event k occurs during some interval [t, t + ∆t] and xi are the unit’s covari-
ates (Cleves et al., 2004: 7).
It is common in diffusion studies to use Cox’s Proportional Hazards (PH) model (1972). The 
Cox PH rate for the ith unit is given by the following:
           h t h t x| exp ,X X( ) = ( ) ( )0 β            (2)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard: the instantaneous rate of a transition at time t when all of the 
covariates are zero (Cleves et al., 2004). See Brooks (2005) for a further justification of the Cox 
PH model in diffusion research.
3.2. Competing risks
This method lacks the ability to model the multiple choices actors have and how the existence of 
these choices affects decisions. We cannot simply run a Cox PH model examining why countries 
chose independent DI and ignore countries that made other choices. Making other choices affects 
the probability of choosing independent DI. We need a way of including this information. A single 
Cox PH model is inadequate here.
Though there are a number of different ways to examine multiple choices (see Putter et al., 
2007), a competing-risks approach is most appropriate for examining DI governance choices in the 
period of interest, as well as new institution variation in general. None of the governance types is 
a priori the final choice. When a country creates deposit insurance with one governance type, it 
could later switch. However, data availability influences the research design. There were only five 
instances between 1970 and 2007 when a country changed governance types at established insur-
ers. A convenient way to handle this data limitation is to confine our research focus to governance 
decisions for new DI.
Also, certain bodies may have de jure control of deposit insurance, while other actors may have 
de facto influence. Though it would be interesting to examine these instances in future research, in 
this article I am solely concerned with de jure governance decisions for new DI. This makes the 
three ‘final’ states of governance shown in Figure 2. In such situations, competing-risks models with 
mutually exclusive non-repeated transitions are the most appropriate EHA type (Pintilie, 2007).
Figure 2. Competing Risk Model of First Deposit Insurance Scheme Governance Choices.
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There are two ways to approach competing risks: transition-specific hazards12 (TSH) and haz-
ards of the sub-distribution (HSD). In practice, the TSH means running Cox PH models for each 
choice, while treating countries that make different choices as censored, that is dropping them from 
the analysis for all following years (Anderson et al., 2002; Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011). This 
is justified and estimated covariate effects will be equivalent to the HSD if the covariates affect 
only one choice (Bakoyannis and Touloumi, 2011). However, we expect covariates to have oppo-
site effects on multiple choices. For example, the democracy hypotheses predict that democracies 
are more likely to create independent and less likely to create ministry of finance DI. For these 
hypotheses, it is more appropriate to use the HSD. Additionally, the TSH is not suited to distin-
guishing the reasons for creating one type of DI governance from the reasons for creating deposit 
insurance overall. The HSD deals with this much more straightforwardly (see Bakoyannis and 
Touloumi, 2011).
The HSD rate at time t, γk(t), for a transition of interest k is given by the following:
      γ
k
t
t T t t C k T t T t C k
tt
( ) =
< ≤ + = > ≤ ≠( ){ }( )
→
lim Pr , |
∆
∆
∆0
or and
    (3)
where T is the time of the observed transition C.13 If at time t no event is observed, then the 
observation is censored. The condition in braces is one in which an event k did not happen until 
after time t (as in standard EHA) or there is the possibility that the observations for a unit have 
ceased because it experienced a competing transition (Pintilie, 2007: 1363).
Fine and Gray (1999) developed a proportional hazards model, analogous to the Cox PH model, 
to estimate hazards of the sub-distribution γk(t):
            γ γk k k
T
t t| exp,X X( ) = ( ) ( )0 β           (4)
Here, γk,0(t) is the baseline sub-hazard. The FG-CREHA allows us to analyze independent vari-
ables on a policy choice of interest while accounting for the potential effects of other choices. Since 
we are interested in governance choices among countries creating their first DI, we are looking for 
effects that differ across the models. Effects having equivalent magnitude, direction, and signifi-
cance indicate common factors behind creating deposit insurance in general (Bakoyannis and 
Touloumi, 2011). These would therefore be ancillary to the focus on governance.
3.3. Variables
The analyses intend to find estimated effects that differ across the models for the following varia-
bles. See the Appendix for summary statistics for the analysis period 1984–2007, which was cho-
sen because of data availability. [AQ: 1]The sample of 174 countries was constricted to 70, the 
extent of Reinhart and Rogoff’s banking-crisis data (2010). Analyses using imputed data14 over a 
similar period for the full sample were conducted as robustness checks. They produced similar 
results and are not shown.
Democracy and electoral competitiveness. Democracy is operationalized with Unified Democracy 
Scores (UDS) (Pemstein et al., 2010). The scores were found with Bayesian latent variable analysis 
using 10 democracy measures, including Freedom House and Polity.15 A new democracy dummy 
variable is also included to see if becoming a democracy had an effect on governance choice. The 
variable equals one for the first five years that a country’s Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2009) was greater than five.
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Electoral competitiveness is operationalized with two variables from Beck et al. (2001), which 
were updated to 2010. They are the indices of legislative electoral competitiveness (LIEC) and the 
indices of executive electoral competitiveness (EIEC). They range from one when there is no elec-
tion to seven when multiple parties or candidates run for office and no party or candidate gets more 
than 75 percent of the vote. As in Keefer (2007), analyses include both the basic variables and 
dummies, which are one if the LIEC or EIEC were six or seven (multiple parties or candidates 
contested the election). It is zero otherwise.
Banking crisis. The second domestic and crisis diffusion hypotheses both make predictions about 
how crises affect governance choices. Banking crisis is a dummy variable equalling one for every 
year that a country has a banking crisis and zero otherwise (from Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010).
Banking system. The structure of the banking sector may influence governance choices. The impor-
tance of deposit banking in general is considered using a ratio of deposit banks’ assets to GDP 
(Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). To make interpretation easier, it is turned into a percentage. 
Alternatively, the importance of big versus small banks is measured using their concentration vari-
able: a country’s three largest banks’ assets to total bank assets in a given year. Though concentra-
tion was included in preliminary analyses, its results are not shown because it had many missing 
values. Other banking variables (discussed below) not directly related to the main hypotheses are 
also included in an attempt to minimize omitted-variable bias.
Peers. According to the regional peer-diffusion hypotheses, as more countries in a region adopt 
specific forms of governance, non-adopting countries will be more likely to create them. This pro-
cess is captured with regional peer independence and MoF spatial effects (Neumayer and Plümper, 
2010). For any one country, this is simply the percentage of other countries in their region that have 
independent or MoF deposit insurance in a given year (adapted from Brooks, 2005; Strang and 
Tuma, 1993). World Bank regional classifications and the full 174-country sample are used to find 
the variables. All regions are included apart from North America (Canada and the USA had deposit 
insurance before the observation period).
A European Union dummy variable is included to account for countries that were or, for candi-
date countries, wanted to be under the jurisdiction of the EU’s DI directive. It equals one for every 
year from 1994 that a country was either a member or a candidate country (as in Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., 2008).
Competition. Though the competition hypothesis is concerned with depositors shifting their funds 
across borders, there is unfortunately little data on deposit flows for the sample. The KAOPEN 
index of capital account openness (Ito and Chinn, 2008) is used as a proxy. It measures de jure 
openness.
The IMF. A dummy variable IMF stand-by is created equalling one in the year that a country signed 
a stand-by agreement with the IMF and also for the following year.16 It may have been useful to 
examine the actual texts of these agreements, limiting the dummy to agreements requiring a spe-
cific governance type. Since few countries have made their agreements available outside of the 
IMF’s archive, this information is difficult to obtain.
Other variables. The following variables are included at some stage of the analysis to explore the 
possibility that omitted-variable bias caused the main results of interest. A number of 
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bureaucratic and general country-level governance-quality measures are included from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2009). Countries with higher-quality governance, 
regardless of democracy level, could be more likely to establish public-goods-enhancing institu-
tions such as independent DI.
Likewise, wealthier countries may be better able to establish complex institutions such as inde-
pendent DI. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) in thousands of current US dollars 
is included (World Bank, 2011).
Central bank strength may influence DI governance choices. Stronger central banks may be 
more likely to gain control of new DI. This would affect the probability of creating independent or 
MoF deposit insurance. The included proxy for strength is central bank governor time in office 
(CBG tenure). This variable is from Dreher et al. (2008, 2010).17
Countries with a high level of government involvement in banking may not establish explicit DI 
programmes at all, since there may already be clear implicit guarantees. Also, given such a propen-
sity for government involvement in banking, if they create deposit insurance, they could be more 
likely to give the MoF control. I include variables for the proportion of deposits and the proportion 
of assets held at banks at least 50 percent owned by the government. The government ownership 
variables are from Barth et al. (2006). However, data are only available for 2005 and, regarding 
assets, for 2000. Analyses are run with these limited variables assuming that they were constant 
over the observation period. The inconclusive results do not indicate an effect on DI governance 
choices and are not reported.
I attempted to include measures of country-averaged ratios for capital to assets and liquid 
reserves to assets (World Bank, 2011). Perhaps those with better-capitalized banks would be less 
likely to create deposit insurance. Unfortunately, the data only extended back to 2000 for most 
countries. This drastically constricts the observation period and led to very inconclusive results 
(not shown).
Of these variables, I only show results from models with GDP per capita and CBG tenure. The 
governance variables were highly correlated with GDP per capita. Removing GDP per capita and 
CBG tenure weakened the magnitude of many main variables’ coefficients, but there were no sub-
stantive changes.
4. Results
Tables 2 and 3 show results from two sets of the FG-CREHA. These coefficients (which are inter-
preted in a similar way to logistic regression coefficients) correspond to the primary governance 
types of interest: ministry of finance and independent. Results from the EHA with central bank DI 
are not shown. It was treated as a competing event in both analyses. Only countries that did not 
have deposit insurance before 1984 are included.18 Since my purpose is to compare reasons for 
different governance choices, estimated differences in sign and significance between the two mod-
els are our focus. They are summarized in Table 1. Note that full replication data and code for all 
analyses shown can be found at http://christophergandrud.github.com/di-governance/data.html.
Before discussing the results, I want to note further alterations that were made as the result of 
numerous robustness checks. Ideally, the analyses would have included as many factors as possible 
that might help explain choices. However, many of the variables are highly correlated with one 
another. Problems associated with high multicollinearity are well known (see Achen, 2002), espe-
cially the tendency to create unreliable coefficient estimates. Numerous regressions were made to 
determine which variables could be meaningfully included (Van den Poel and Larivière, 2004), 
only a subset of which are shown. Schoenfeld-like residuals plotted against analysis time, along 
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with locally weighted regression-smoothed lines, were used to diagnose how the models con-
formed to the proportional hazards assumption: whether covariates are multiplicatively associated 
with the hazard (Fine and Gray, 1999: 503). Linear time-varying coefficients were added for vari-
ables that violated the assumption (Stata Corporation, 2009: 214–5). For these variables, the coef-
ficients consist of both a time-invariant part β and βg(t) that varies linearly with analysis time.
19 The 
estimated coefficients are [β + βg(t)].
Note that because the analysis time is standardized,20 time-specific events common to all units 
(for example, best-practice promotion) are captured in the baseline sub-hazard. The coefficients 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 are estimated effects averaged over the analysis time (Hernán, 2010). 
Ideally, predicted probabilities would be graphed to illustrate the interplay between the baseline 
sub-hazard and the variables. However, there is currently no straightforward way to make these 
graphs in Stata or R for FG-CREHA models with time-varying coefficients. It is to be hoped that 
future versions will include this. A solution for identifying the impact of time-period-specific best-
practice promotion is to compare FG-CREHA models with constricted time periods (see below).
4.1. Similarities
My purpose in this article is not to determine why explicit DI is created in general.21 However, the 
central bank governor’s tenure variable had a similar time-varying effect in both of the models, 
indicating that it may be part of the process behind both choices. In separate models in which cen-
tral bank control was the event of interest, it seems to have had no effect. Across the main choices 
of interest in the mid-1980s, central bank governor tenure is estimated to have a positive effect. The 
longer the central bank governor’s tenure, the more likely that ministry of finance or independent 
DI was created. However, beginning in the 1990s this reversed. It is unclear why this was so and is 
beyond my scope here.
4.2. Differences
Despite this similarity, most significant effects varied between the two models, suggesting they 
influenced governance choices.
Table 1. Summary Comparison of Estimated Covariate Effects.
None ? MoF None ? independent
Democracy (UDS) tvc (+ to –)
New democracy – +
Banking crisis +  
Deposit bank assets/GDP tvc (– to +) or +  
Peer region, by type +
Capital openness (KAOPEN) tvc (– to +)  
IMF stand-by  
EU (from 1994) – +
GDP/capita +
CBG tenure tvc (+ to –) tvc (+ to –)
Notes: The directions (signs) of the estimated effects are shown if they were consistently significant at at least the 10 
percent level. A time-varying coefficient is indicated by ‘tvc’, that is the coefficient switches sign over the course of the 
analysis. The order of the signs over time is shown in parentheses.
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Table 2. Fine and Gray Competing Risks Coefficients for Creating an MoF-Controlled First Deposit Insurer (Others Competing).
Variable A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12
Democracy (UDS) 0.227  
 (0.401)  
New democracy −21.167*** −15.177*** −19.197***
 (0.62) (0.875) (1.157)
DB assets/GDP −0.016 −0.013 0.015** 0.013**
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005)
Crisis dummy 1.645** 1.537* 1.597* 3.134*** 2.706***
 (0.823) (0.814) (0.905) (0.775) (0.720)
Regional peer SE (MoF) 0.096* 0.042 0.046
 (0.052) (0.073) (0.070)
Capital openness 
(KAOPEN) 
−7.091*** −8.434*** −8.173***
(2.546) (2.623) (2.997)
IMF stand-by 1.226* 1.048 1.283  
 (0.707) (0.785) (0.914)  
EU (from 1994) −12.184*** −14.133*** −12.131*** −13.980*** −14.179*** −11.485*** −12.665*** −12.850*** −14.279*** −14.998*** −16.395*** −15.146***
 (1.323) (1.171) (1.332) (1.154) (1.471) (1.274) (1.235) (1.118) (1.223) (1.287) (0.860) (1.215)
GDP/capita −0.130 −0.136 −0.067 −0.126 −0.125* −0.065 −0.005  
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.103) (0.077) (0.069) (0.078) (0.072)  
CBG tenure 0.353 0.371 0.318 0.282 0.271 0.331 0.460* 0.267 0.225 0.173 0.342
 (0.262) (0.251) (0.278) (0.272) (0.228) (0.245) (0.244) (0.255) (0.251) (0.252) (0.229)
Time interactions  
Capital openness 
(KAOPEN) 
0.491*** 0.594*** 0.583***
(0.170) (0.193) (0.211)
CBG tenure −0.191** −0.199** −0.179* −0.174* −0.144* −0.183** −0.181** −0.158** −0.133** −0.113** −0.128*
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.097) (0.089) (0.077) (0.088) (0.085) (0.072) (0.063) (0.054) (0.070)
DB assets/GDP 0.002*** 0.002**  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Countries at risk 49 50 49 47 49 49 49 49 49 47 49 47
No. of MoF created 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Pseudo-log likelihood −25.471 −26.263 −24.871 −23.882 −23.226 −24.409 −21.215 −24.043 −22.197 −19.342 −18.298 −14.764
Chi2 197.365 228.187 1316.392 249.775 215.864 195.558 281.116 247.356 238.83 359.971 1146.172 1205.021
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: * indicates 10 percent; ** indicates 5 percent; and *** indicates 1 percent. GDP/capita was dropped from models with Democracy 
(UDS) and Deposit Bank assets/GDP due to high correlations (0.693 and 0.708, respectively). The governance-quality indicators are not shown for the same reason. Only significant time interactions 
are shown.
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Table 3. Fine and Gray Competing Risks Coefficients for Creating a Specialized and Independently Controlled First Deposit Insurer (Others 
Competing).
Variable B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11
Democracy (UDS) 2.222*** 1.270* 2.335***
 (0.552) (0.690) (0.746)
New democracy 1.503** 0.395 0.890*
 (0.617) (0.599) (0.530)
DB assets/GDP 0.000  
 (0.006)  
Crisis dummy 0.766 0.792  
 (0.513) (0.499)  
Regional peer SE (Ind.) 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.036*
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Capital openness 
(KAOPEN) 
−0.357  
(0.248)  
IMF stand-by −0.687 −0.746  
 (0.763) (0.761)  
EU (from 1994) 2.000** 2.104** 1.611** 2.694*** 1.835** 1.764** 1.916** 2.009** 1.831** 1.001 1.648*
 (0.805) (0.818) (0.734) (0.679) (0.779) (0.722) (0.837) (0.782) (0.754) (0.753) (0.864)
GDP/capita 0.072*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.110*** 0.064** 0.078***  
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.027) (0.028)  
CBG tenure 0.157** 0.173** 0.179*** 0.162** 0.142** 0.186*** 0.144** 0.155** 0.139** 0.189**
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.063) (0.070) (0.058) (0.063) (0.061) (0.078)
Time interactions  
Democracy (UDS) −0.144*** −0.068 −0.144***
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.050)
CBG tenure −0.024*** −0.026*** −0.028*** −0.026** −0.022** −0.029** −0.023*** −0.025*** −0.022*** −0.031**
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Countries at risk 49 49 49 47 49 50 49 49 49 53 50
No. of ind. created 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 20 18
Pseudo-log likelihood −55.156 −50.100 −53.021 −53.871 −54.103 −54.549 −53.892 −54.717 −53.586 −63.164 −48.846
Chi2 27.660 35.067 26.533 19.818 33.760 27.381 31.179 31.949 44.616 27.083 32.830
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: * indicates 10 percent; ** indicates 5 percent; and *** indicates 1 percent. GDP/capita was dropped from models with Democracy 
(UDS) and Deposit Bank assets/GDP due to high correlations (0.693 and 0.708, respectively). The governance-quality indicators are not shown for the same reason. Only significant time interactions 
are shown.
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Democracy. Democracy seems to have had no effect on giving control to the MoF. Its estimated 
effect on independent DI went from positive in the early part of the analysis period to weakly nega-
tive around the year 2000. New democracies were less likely to create MoF deposit insurance than 
older democracies and other regimes. The reverse effect was found for independent DI, in line with 
the hypothesis that democracies are more likely to delegate.
Democracy’s time-varying coefficient seems to be driven by Australia and New Zealand, whose 
major banks are based in Australia. These were the only countries in the sample with a high UDS 
after 2002 and no deposit insurance. Unobserved factors may have influenced their choices not to 
create deposit insurance. Once the ‘Oceania effect’ is accounted for, it seems that democracies did 
prefer delegating. Limiting the sample to 1984 through to 2000 made the time-varying coefficient 
no longer significant.
Results from models with electoral competitiveness are not shown as they mirrored those with 
the UDS variable, but were less robust. Perhaps, incumbents are not only incentivized to create 
independent DI because of electoral accountability. Legal controls on corruption could constrain 
their ability to gain rents from banks. Transparency could reveal information about real and poten-
tial crisis costs to voters making them more able to sanction incumbents (Rosas, 2006). The UDS 
variable incorporates these factors, while the competitiveness variables do not.
Deposit banks’ assets to GDP. Depending on the set of other covariates included in the model, the 
relative size of the deposit banking sector had a weak time-varying coefficient (almost negative to 
no effect in the first few years and then positive) or was simply positive, as in the ‘garbage can’ 
MoF model. This suggests very weak evidence for the hypothesis that, in order for guarantees to 
be credible in countries with large banking sectors, decision-makers directly link them to the public 
budget.
Banking crises. As predicted by the MoF credibility hypothesis, countries with banking crises were 
more likely to create their first insurer controlled by the MoF. There appears to be no effect of crisis 
on delegating. So evidence was not found to support the proposition that in crises actors reached 
for best-practice independence ideas. The obviously high costs of guaranteeing deposits during 
crises may simply make these recommendations implausible, regardless of their promotion.
As noted in the discussion of possible IMF coercion, there is limited evidence that IMF staff 
generally supported or at least acquiesced to countries in crises creating MoF control. Could the 
positive relationship between crises and MoF control actually be caused by recommendations? 
There are reasons to be doubtful. The IMF recommendations for countries in crisis generally dis-
couraged the creation of new DI. We also find no relationship between a country having an IMF 
stand-by agreement and MoF deposit insurance (see below).
Peers. Though the results do not provide support for the crisis diffusion hypothesis, they do suggest 
that regional peers influence governance choices. First, though EU legislation did not require a 
specific governance type, being an EU member or candidate seems consistently to have had both a 
positive effect on decisions to delegate governance and a negative effect on creating MoF control. 
Second, the proportion of regional peers with independent DI had a positive effect on delegation 
choices, even controlling for EU status. Conversely, the proportion of peers with MoF control does 
not appear to have had a relationship with choices. Separate analyses with a 1984–93 sample were 
conducted with the regional peer and general EU variables to see if the estimated effects were actu-
ally related to the mid-1990s recommendations, rather than being a general effect of another pro-
cess. In the pre-1994 analysis, the variables had no relationship with choices. By examining the 
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time-period-specific ‘biases’ in the sample (Hernán, 2010) rather than just average effects, it is 
likely that peer emulation, simple learning, or some other time-independent regional effects are 
insufficient. Regional proximity and organizations appear to interact with recommendations to 
influence choices.
Competition. The capital openness variable had no relationship with delegation, and had a 
time-varying coefficient with MoF deposit insurance. It had a small negative effect until later 
in the observation period, when it became positive. However, the result is largely driven by 
El Salvador and Uruguay creating MoF deposit insurance around 2000. Both had very high 
KAOPEN scores. This provides weak evidence against the competition hypothesis, and sug-
gests that there may be no association between competition and governance choices. Note 
that these results are not conclusive given the incomplete operationalization. Nonetheless, it 
does seem that having a more open banking system, one more prone to competition, did not 
impact choices.
IMF coercion. Though the IMF may have been important in promoting deposit insurance generally, 
there is little evidence that it coerced countries to adopt a governance style. This was especially 
true once the crisis variable was included.22 IMF stipulations in stand-by agreements may have 
been inconsequential, since MoF deposit insurance would have been created by countries in crisis 
regardless. This result does not indicate that the IMF was not an important force in governance 
trends, just that its influence did not work through coercion.
4.3. Comparing the FG-CREHA to Cox PH
How do the results from the FG-CREHA compare to the Cox PH models used to estimate the TSH? 
Figure 3 shows coefficients estimated from the FG-CREHA in models A12 (ministry of finance 
DI) and B11 (independent DI) as well as Cox PH models with the same variables and competing 
events treated as censored. As expected based on the statistical literature, when a covariate was 
found to have an effect on only one choice, the estimates were equivalent. We saw that crises have 
a positive relationship with creating ministry of finance DI, but no relationship with independent 
DI. The FG-CREHA and Cox PH crisis coefficients are similar. Other variables, such as being a 
new democracy and being an EU member or candidate, were found to have opposite effects on the 
two choices. Estimates from the two EHA methods are very different. Cox PH estimates are nega-
tive for both decisions, whereas the FG-CREHA estimates for both variables are positive for inde-
pendent and negative for MoF deposit insurance. The FG-CREHA estimates fit our predictions. In 
such situations, the statistical literature indicates that FG-CREHA estimates are more accurate. 
These findings justify the use of the FG-CREHA here.
Discussion. In this article, I have attempted to understand why countries converged on independent 
DI in the mid-1990s. I have also sought to make an important methodological contribution to pol-
icy-diffusion studies by demonstrating how the FG-CREHA can be used to research decisions in 
complex choice environments. The FG-CREHA is useful for studying policy choices (1) when 
there are multiple policies to choose from, (2) when choices on different, but necessarily related 
issues are made simultaneously, and (3) when we expect relationships between causes and choices 
to vary over time and (4) have different effects on more than one choice.
The FG-CREHA has allowed us to identify a number of possible reasons why countries con-
verged on independent DI. The FG-CREHA enabled the identification of a possible positive 
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relationship between regional-peer governance-type adoption and best-practice ideas. It is fairly 
conclusive from this evidence that a simple emulation process did not drive choices, otherwise the 
positive relationships would have been more consistently observed across the governance types. 
By pinpointing the time correlation between when recommendations were made and when peer-
adoption trends began, we can suggest that recommendations helped initiate peer learning pro-
cesses. Recommendations seem to have acted as a catalyst for learning.
The FG-CREHA enabled us to see how domestic functional factors affected convergence pat-
terns. An increasing proportion of democratic countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s may have 
helped cause the observed convergence. Democracies, and especially new democracies, appear to 
be more likely to delegate. This is possibly due to electoral incentives to mitigate public costs. 
These results are puzzling given the regional-peer findings.
Did actors objectively know that independent DI reduces moral hazard and helps prevent cri-
ses? This seems doubtful, given the scarcity of non-ambiguous empirical evidence. The fact that I 
found some evidence for both hypotheses should not actually be that surprising. Both are based on 
exaggerated assumptions about actors’ information. In reality, actors do not have perfect informa-
tion about how DI governance will achieve electorally conditioned goals. Equally, they are not 
totally ignorant of the effects of governance styles in the absence of IMF recommendations or peer 
evidence.
Crises seemed to dampen the spread of independence. During a crisis the main problem for new 
insurers is credibility. Because guarantees could be very costly, new programmes tend to be cred-
ible when directly backed by the national budget. Crises, rather than promoting the adoption of best 
practice, can actually inhibit it when large liabilities are apparent. This suggests we need at least to 
Figure 3. Comparing Coefficient Estimates from FG-CREHA and Transition-Specific Cox PH.
Notes: The plots compare coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals estimated with FG-CREHA and Cox PH using 
the variables in A12 (MoF) and B11 (independent). Unfortunately, a few of the estimates (for example, for new democ-
racies) are large numbers and distort the graph’s scales, making it difficult to discern small, but sometimes substantively 
meaningful coefficients.
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qualify claims that countries adopt policies for socially diffused reasons (see McNamara, 2002) 
when high and obvious fiscal costs are involved.
It is important to note a major limitation. Since only about 6 percent of countries changed gov-
ernance in existing insurers, governance and DI-creation choices are empirically tied together. It is 
very difficult to separate the complex interactions leading to both governance and insurance-crea-
tion choices. I am limited to identifying explicitly different results across models. This would be a 
limitation for any research on variation in new institutions. Nonetheless, I have made an important 
step in expanding our ability to examine policy choices in complex environments. This enables 
future researchers to examine convergence and variation in other policies and institutions.
Notes
Thank you to the LSE PSPE seminar, Kristina Gandrud, Mark Hallerberg, Edward Kane, Jouni Kuha, Simon 
Hix, Charles Goodhardt, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Kevin Young, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2011 KPSA World Congress. Replication data 
and code can be found at the following URL: http://christophergandrud.github.com/di-governance/data.html.    
 1. Central bank control is treated as distinct. It can be independent, but also tends to be a well-established 
institution with significant financial resources such as the MoF. Deposit insurance controlled by a cen-
tral bank is not examined in detail. Results from analyses with central bank governance as the choice 
of interest are available upon request. For the full list of countries examined and their observed type of 
de jure DI governance, see the following URL: http://christophergandrud.github.com/di-governance/
tables.html.
 2. Other authors, particularly Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), have looked at why countries create explicit DI 
using single-transition EHA.
 3. It can be implemented with the Stata 11 (and higher) stcrreg command.
 4. Data are based on a sample of programme descriptions in 166 countries by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005). 
The author coded the programmes, expanded the sample to 174 countries, and extended it through to 
2007 using the relevant national organizations’ websites.
 5. With a few exceptions, some detailed below, this remains true.
 6. This article generally does not make a distinction between independent public and private DI schemes, 
which may be relevant for this theory. Nonetheless, private schemes are mostly in Caribbean countries 
not included in the final analysis.
 7. Regarding this, see the following URL: https://www.insattningsgarantin.se/en/Om-verksamheten/
Relation-till-riksgalden/.
 8. The first systematic study of deposit insurance’s general effects was published in 2002 by Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache.
 9. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine why this recommendation was made. For an example 
of this type of research, see Chwieroth (2009).
10. The number of banking crises globally fell from the mid-1990s to 2007 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010: 21).
11. Electronic publication requires individual country agreement.
12. ‘Cause-specific hazard’ is used in epidemiology.
13. Covariates are omitted for simplicity.
14. These were created with the R package Amelia II (Honaker et al., 2010).
15. Only posterior means are used.
16. Data were taken from Dreher (2006) and updated to 2008.
17. Regarding modifications to this variable, please contact the author of the current article.
18. Of the 70 countries in the sample mentioned above, 53 were at risk. Nine of these created ministry of 
finance DI and 20 created independent DI.
19. Other functions were tested, but did not substantially increase model fit.
20. All analysis times were standardized, with zero being the first observation year and 24 the last.
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21. For coefficient estimates from models looking at the creation of any type of new DI, please contact the 
author.
22. The two are not strongly correlated here.
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